Intelligence and Spirit

Between Conception and Transformation

A rough preamble -- a rough sketch -- to provide an outline of a functionalist and deprivatized account of mind, or geistig intelligence.

It is only what it does

functionalist perspective (p1):

mind is only what it does, what it does is first and foremost realized (pogojeno) by the sociality of agents, which itself is primarily (and ontologically) constituted by the semantic space of a public language

dionysian approach (p2):

(in contrast to the Apollonian) does not abide by historical accuracy or result in faithful treatises, but instead sees the positive insights and theses of philosophies distortedly through the lens of the contemporary. The Dionysian approach then goes on to selectively but critically mutate, re-engineer, and integrate what it has thus distortedly viewed through the contemporary optic.

It is in this Dionysian spirit that the book examines and reconstructs the premises and conclusions of the functional picture of mind as to build a philosophy of intelligence. (p3)

geistig intelligence:

!zapiši

"If we were to outline the overall progression of the book in reverse order, as if we had already attained its ultimate conclusions: Philosophy as the organ of self-cultivation of intelligence is, in the broadest sense, a historical program for investigating the consequences of the possibility of thinking and having mind." (p5)

The functional picture of geist enables a thoroughgoing analysis of essentially self-conscious creatures. Self-conscious agents potrebujejo kakšne strukture in kakšne dejavnosti... funkcionalen opis (opis funkcij) diskurzivnega, konceptualnega, zgodovinskega duha (geist) v kontekstu teh dejavnosti, ki ga zaznamujejo in tudi konstituirajo. Projekt praktične in teoretične desakralizacije uma. Emancipacija od nečesa, emancipacija k nečemu (za delanje nečesa). [p6]

'suspension' or 'to suspend' used as aufheben:

Aufheben has four connotations. (1) to lift up or to heave as if something is on or has fallen to the ground; (2) to pick up or actively seize something, which accentuates the previous connotation; (3) to preserve or retain something; (4) to cancel or abolish something, to remove or take out of action.

as if (kot da)

Functions and multilevel structural constraints [11--19]

Brief comments regarding the kind of functionalism or functional analysis this book draws upon.

"The mind is what it does to the extent that there are adequate material-causal and logical-semantic structures that support its activities." [p11]

Torej, a functional analysis of mind attentive to the question of structural adequacy and constraint as well as that of types and distinctions of structures... pravilna metoda 'carving at the joints'

'as if functions' describe causal-structural mechanisms and functions proper.

attribute functions to organizing structures which support and afford the realization of mind.

functionalism of mind as (1) configured and (2) configuring unity (iz tega tudi sledi; pluralnost constituentov je potrebna za konstitucijo uma -- socialnost, socialna ontologija)

"For this reason, functional analysis demands a coherentist view that sees a single function in terms of activities that are qualitatively different from the role it appears to be playing. Functions are not a matter of pure abstractions since they are dimensionally varied and multiply constrained. ‘Dimensionally varied’ means that a function can only be adequately analysed in terms of the qualitatively distinct structural constraints required for its realization—constraints that are distributed across different levels (dimensions) of the functional-structural organization. ‘Multiply con­strained’ means that the specificities of a function are determined by distinct structural levels that constrain it in particular ways." [p12]

function as dimensionally varied and multiply constrained.

A proper analysis of a function is a blueprint for the realization of that function, and its potential modification via changes in its underlying structural constraints. (p13)

deep picture of a function:

dimensionally varied and multiply constrained description of a function. Deep, ker si funkcijo predstavlja kot organizirano (by activities, constraints, and unities) at different structural levels or scales. Splošni atributi funkcije so determinirani kot so-delovanje večih dejavnosti, ki jih ne moremo mergat ali seštet. Deep picture ne razloži kako funkcija zgleda, ampak razloži kako je organizirana.

flat picture of a function:

One-to-one correspondence between realizer and realized. f --> f_d. Potem mata kamen in sir tudi um.

functional description of mind potrebuje tudi razlago integracije distinktivnih procesov, dejavnosti ... razlago constraints.

[p15--16] Razlaga neke napake in primerjava s kritiko kapitalizma. Napaka vodi v fetišizem (odnosi med stvarmi)

treba functional analysis AND the study of structural complexity

function of functionalism (pogojeno) Hegel je odkril realizande in constrainte, ki so reengineeral geist.

sensible object (gegenstand) [p18]

object of thought (objekt)

Functional integration: phases of geist [19--26]

Self-relation: a function in progress [26--35]

?theoretical, practical, axiological (p32)

Self-consciousness as conception and transformation in an objective world [35--44]

A series of transformations [44--]

Thus it can be said that adequate self-conception leads to the enabling of self-transformation, and concrete self transformation opens the path to objective self-conception.

The history of geist, which is the history of intelligence, is a sequence of self-transformations according to its own concept, a concept whose particular content is open to revision. This sequence or history, as will be argued in chapter 4, must necessarily be thought as an atemporal series of transformations. As we shall see, in its genuine form it is a history conceived according to a view from nowhen.

History as the elaboration of what it means to be an artefact of the concept

Science (Wissenschaft) ranges across not just the empirical sciences and the science of mind, but also embraces the science of history and the science of the Greater Logic, which is the science of thinking the intelligible unity of mind and world, thought and being, the autonomy of the former and the excess of the latter's otherness. [46--47]

When it comes to geist, it is more apt to speak in the plural, to speak of histories or chronicles of reconstitutions rather that of a history of constitution. [50]

A note on theory, mind's structuring function, and ratiocinating powers

!kaj je teorija

[A]ny systematic theory should make explicit how such elements hang together within it.

[A]ny genuinely systematic theory should also elaborate in what manner it is an extension of philosophy of mind.

Selves as functional items as artefacts of mind

Like an artificial multi-agent system, geist is the configuration &ndash the configuring and the configured -- of discursive apperceptive rational or thinking selves. However, this system is structured not by simple communication or social grouping but by a logical or inferential-semantic space.

The sapience controversy

[T]he controversies around human sapience all originate in one way or another from the illicit merger of sapience understood as a formal quality which can encompass any sentience that structurally satisfies its condition of realization, and sapience understood as a substantive quality that ranks a being above other beings. [57]

!Puntel [60]

!Anti-humanism [61]

Rational integration, judgement, and generation of further abilities

The concept of history then is nothing but a necessary link -- a dynamics -- between conception and transformation. [64]

Historical awareness as an essential constructive and critical ability

Only once a manifest totality is understood as an appearance, a fleeting realization, can it be concretely overcome.

The dasein of geist

!anxiety [75]

geist at the edge of intelligibility

Objective science without subject-constituting mind is a subjective delusion. [79]

!common sence, seemings [80]

An Outside View of Ourselves as Experimental AGI (Problems, Concepts, and Models)

An inquiry into the necessary conditions for the realization of geistig intelligence in the form of a program of AGI, as if what we were really doing was attempting to construct and AGI. A thought experiment, not to investigate the possibility of constructing an AGI, but to think about AGI as an outside view of ourselves.

This I, or We or It, the Thing, Which Speaks (Forms of Intuition)

Investigation of the necessary conditions for the possibility of having mind. The focus in this chapter is largely on what might be called the Kantian dimensions of the realization of the discursive apperceptive self, namely intuition, imagination, and pure perspectival encounter with the world.

Some Unsettling Kantian News, as Delivered by Boltzmann (An Excursion into Time)

A critical excursus that stirs things up somewhat, and prepares the conclusions reached by ch. 3 for their speculative extrapolation in the final chapter. Its focus is the question of temporality and forms of intuition (transcendental aesthetics) as the organizing factors of experience, a question whose proper formulation will lead us to a new perspective not only on experience but also on the model of the minded subject and the prospects of intelligence as time itself.

This I, or We or It, the Thing, Which Speaks (Objectivity and Thought)

Continues the mission of ch. 3, but with the focus shifted to the realization of the 'discursive apperceptive' aspects of geistig intelligence, moving from the realm of pure perspectiviality to that of objectivity, where thought and beliefs have an epistemic status.

This I, or We or It, the Thing, Which Speaks (Dasein of Geist)

(with ch. 7) One of the last stages of the thought experiment. Examines the language as the dasein of geist, inquiring into its sociality and syntactic-semantic complexity in a vein thet is much closer to theoretical computer science. This investigation will allow us to conclude out examination into the neccessary condition for discursive apperceptive intelligence, an intelligence which acts in conformity with time-general thoughts determined by the conception it has of itself.

This I, or We or It, the Thing, Which Speaks (Language as Interaction as Computation)

Philosophy of Intelligence

Both AGI and the functional deprivatized account of the mind are suspended (aufheben) in the form of intelligence which is at once philosophy and a craft of philosophy qua specific program thinking that has no nature, but only a history: a model for a self-cultivating intelligence.

Appendix: Quandaries of Induction in Philosophy of Knowledge, Philosophy of Mind, and Artificial Intelligence